Henry A.  Wallace\u27s Turn Toward the New Deal, 1921-1924 by Kirkendall, Richard S.
The Annals of Iowa 
Volume 49 Number 3 (Winter 1988) pps. 221-239 
Henry A. Wallace's Turn Toward the New Deal, 1921-1924 
Richard S. Kirkendall 
ISSN 0003-4827 
No known copyright restrictions. 
Recommended Citation 
Kirkendall, Richard S. "Henry A. Wallace's Turn Toward the New Deal, 1921-1924." The 
Annals of Iowa 49 (1988), 221-239. 
Available at: https://doi.org/10.17077/0003-4827.12089 
Hosted by Iowa Research Online 
Henry A. Wallace's Turn
Toward the New Deal,
1921-1924
RICHARD S. KIRKENDALL
A s SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE in Franklin D. Roosevelt's New
Deal of the 1930s, Henry A. Wallace supplied leadership in the
development of a new and large role for the federal govern-
ment in the operations of the American agricultural system.
That expansion of government was the main feature of the
New Deal for agriculture. These facts are well known. Less
clear in the major accounts of Wallace's life are when and why
he reached the conclusion that Washington should exert great
influence on farm production and commodity prices.' A close
look at his intellectual development indicates that his first
three years as editor of Wallaces' Farmer were crucial in the de-
velopment of his thinking in this area. It was then that he
moved from rejection to acceptance of large-scale federal in-
volvement in the agricultural system. In those years his con-
ception of his responsibilities to one segment of the farm popu-
lation, his sense of crisis, the frustration of his efforts to end the
crisis through voluntary means, and the influence of his father
affected the movement of his thought.
Henry A. Wallace became editor of Wallaces' Farmer in
March 1921, following the departure of his father, Henry C, to
I am grateful for help from Loren N. Horton of the State Historical Soci-
ety of Iowa; Glenda Riley of the Universisty of Northern Iowa; members of a
discussion club in the Iowa State University history department, especially
Alan I Marcus, Robert E. Scofield, Hamilton Cravens, and Richard Lowitt; the
Graduate School of Iowa State University; and the Wallace Fund of the Iowa
State University Foundation.
1. Russell Lord, The Wallaces of Iowa (Boston, 1947); Edward L.
Schapsmeier and Frederick H. Schapsmeier, Henry A. Wallace of Iowa: The
Agrarian Years (Ames, 1968).
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Washington to serve as secretary of agriculture. Although only
in his early thirties, H. A. had already gained considerable pres-
tige. His pioneering work on farm prices had brought him to the
attention of many people in farm circles. Published in Wallaces'
Farmer and a 1920 book. Agricultural Prices, his findings sug-
gested that price statistics were very important to farmers, that
farm prices were too low relative to other prices, that this threat-
ened all industries and all people, not just farmers, and that a
new price-making system should be adopted. His work had not
persuaded him, however, that government should set farm
prices.^
Wallace's conception of the proper level of farm prices and
its importance for nonfarmers represented a point of view that
historians and others have labeled agrarianism or agricultural
fundamentalism. This is the "conviction that agriculture is par
excellence the fundamental industry, and that farmers are, in a *
peculiar sense and degree, of basic importance in society."
Agrarians regarded agriculture and rural life as basic to Ameri-
can welfare economically, politically, and socially. Summarizing
this philosophy in the language of the time. President Theodore
Roosevelt and his Country Life Commission contended early in
the century.
Upon the development of this distinctively rural civilization rests
ultimately our ability, by methods of farming requiring the high-
est intelligence, to continue to feed and clothe the hungry na-
tions; to supply the city with fresh blood, clean bodies, and clear
brains that can endure the terrific strain of modern life; and to
preserve a race of men in the open country that in the future as in
the past, will be the stay and strength of the nation in time of war,
and its guiding and controlling spirit in time of peace.^
2. James H. Shideler, Farm Crisis, 1919-1923 (Berkeley, 1957), 198-99;
Joel P. Kunze, "The Early Political Economy of Henry A. Wallace" (unpub-
lished paper in author's possession).
3. Joseph S. Davis, "Agricultural Fundamentalism," in O. R. Jesness, ed..
Readings in Agricultural Policy (Philadelphia, 1949), 5; Gilbert C. Fite, "The
Historic Development of Agricultural Fundamentalism in the Nineteenth
Century," Journal of Farm Economics 44 (1962), 1203-11; Wayne D.
Rasmussen, ed.. Agriculture in the United States: A Documentary History (New
York, 1975), 1863-64,1870.
222
Wallace's Turn Toward the New Deal
Agrarianism was part of H. A.'s inheritance. His grandfather,
"Uncle Henry," "the founder of the illustiious Iowa Wallace family,"
the first editor of Wallaces' Farmer, and a member of the Counti-y
Life Commission, was "simultaneously a nostalgic agrarian and an
advocate of scientific agriculture." H. A.'s father, Henry C , also
shared the agrarian philosophy and handed it down to his son. As
editor of Wallaces' Farmer, H. A. expressed the agrarianism that his
grandfather and father also voiced.*
Yet agrarian values were not the only major component of
H. A.'s thought. His perception of realities nearly overwhelmed
his agrarianism, persuading him that the economic system could
not be totally reshaped to conform to his view of rural values,
however desirable that might be. In an attempt to be realistic, he
would advise farmers to accept and imitate, rather than reject
and attack, some important urban patterns of thought and
behavior.^
A s AN AGRARIAN AND A FARM EDITOR, Wallace felt a Strong sense of
responsibility to farmers, but it did not extend with equal
strength to all of them. He viewed farmers as divided into supe-
rior and inferior groups, with his readers in the superior cate-
gory in the region served by Wallaces' Farmer "We cover Iowa,
northern Missouri, central Illinois, eastern Nebraska, and a
small part of northeastern Kansas," the journal reported to the
authors of a textbook on agricultural journalism. Within that re-
gion, Wallaces' Farmer appealed, according to its own definition,
"to the conservative type of farmer." Owners of good farms with
no mortgages or only small ones, the paper explained in 1921,
"make up about 35 percent of the farmers of the corn belt. They
4. David D. Danbom, The Resisted Revolution: Urban America and the In-
dustrialization of Agriculture, 1900-1930 (Ames, 1979), 43; Donald L. Winters,
Henry Cantwell Wallace as Secretary of Agriculture, 1921-1924 (Urbana, 111.,
1970), 297; Richard S. Kirkendall, "The Mind of a Farm Leader," Anno/s of Iowa
47 (Fall 1983), 138. On Wallace's agrarianism in the 1920s, see also Don S.
Kirschner, "Henry A. Wallace as Farm Editor," American Quarterly 17 (Summer
1965), 187-202.
5. Two essays supplied especially helpful insights concerning the intel-
lectual problem that Wallace faced: Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform
(New York, 1955), especially pp. 109-30, and David W. Noble, "American
Studies and the Burden of Frederick Jackson Turner: The Case of Henry Nash
Smith and Richard Hofstadter," The Journal of American Culture 4 (Winter
1981), 34-45.
223
THE ANNALS OF IOWA
feel at times that they are just as much business men as the peo-
ple in the cities. . .. They are the conservatives." Landowning
fanners, the publication proclaimed, "make up the great conser-
vative force of the body politic."^
Wallaces'Farmer did not identify with what it called "radical
farmers." Some of these "radicals," according to H. A.'s analysis,
owned unencumbered farms but ones that had poor land or
were small, less than 140 acres. Others owned larger farms that
were heavily mortgaged; still others were tenants. "In times like
these," Wallaces' Farmer explained, "many of these men are
pushed perilously close to bankruptcy, and they naturally turn
toward such schemes as governmnent ownership of railroads,
currency reforms, etc." H. A. clearly opposed "radicals who have
been connected with farmer-labor movements" and applauded
policies that prevented them from gaining support. He warned
"the big bankers of the east" that "demogogs [sic] and yellow
farm papers mislead the farmers, offering as cures nostrums
which can do no good whatsoever." The best farmers, he be-
lieved, had "remained true to the old ways of thinking and act-
ing," but he feared that "another winter of low prices will make
radicals of many of these men."''
Wallaces' Farmer identified with the substantial commercial
farm family of the type that joined the new Farm Bureau. Before
H. A. took over as editor, the publication had applauded the for-
mation of the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation in 1918 and the
American Farm Bureau Federation (AFBF) two years later. In
fact, H. C. had participated significantly in these develop-
ments.8 "The federation," he insisted at an AFBF meeting, "must
be made the most powerful business institution in the country."
James R. Howard of Marshalltown, the president of both the
Iowa and the American farm bureaus in their early years, re-
6. Nelson Antrim Crawford and Charles Eakins Rogers, Agricultural
Journalism (New York, 1926), 278; Wallaces' Farmer, 27 April 1923,12 August
1921, 6 January, 31 March 1922.
7. Wallaces' Farmer, 12 August 1921, 3 February, 1 September 1922.
8. Grant McConnell, The Decline of Agrarian Democracy (Berkeley, 1953),
56; Christina McFayden Campbell, The Farm Bureau and the New Deal
(Urbana, 111., 1962), 26-27; D. B. Groves and Kenneth Thatcher, The First Fifty:
History of Farm Bureau in Iowa (Lake Mills, Iowa, 1968), 46; Robert P. Howard,
James R. Howard and the Farm Bureau (Ames, 1983), 82, 106, 205; Wallaces'
Farmer, 22 December 1922; Shideler, Farm Crisis, 123.
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garded Wallace as "the best of the farm paper men," and the
AFBF supported his nomination as secretary of agriculture. In
that office, Wallace, in turn, maintained good relations with the
Iowa and national organizations.'
As editor of Wallaces' Farmer, H. A. preserved the paper's
good relations with the Farm Bureau.i° Although not uncritical,
he often defended it against its foes, insisting that "if the farmers
of the corn belt are going to get economic justice they must
maintain this organization and make it strong." Pointing out that
it was being criticized both as "a radical menace to business" and
as having "gone over to Big Biz," he suggested that such com-
plaints were "the usual reward of any organization that tries to
steer a sane and constructive course.""
Wallace not only defended the Farm Bureau but also op-
posed its chief rival, the Iowa Farmers Union, and its fiery presi-
dent, Milo Reno. A foe of the bureau and its allies, the county
agents, Reno looked upon the Wallaces as too close to bankers,
packers, and the like. A critic of similar persuasion complained
of the paper's "misplaced hopes" in the Farm Bureau.^ ^
The new farm organization figured in the old animosity be-
tween Wallaces' Farmer and the Iowa Homestead. Based in Des
Moines as was its competitor, the Homestead also enjoyed con-
siderable prestige. Both papers were aimed at the Corn Belt, and
the rivalry was so bitter that Wallaces' Farmer dubbed the other
paper the "Iowa Hatestead."" Although the Homestead initially
9. Howard, Howard, 92,120,139; Winters, Wallace, 53,136-40; Henry C.
Wallace to Charles E. Hearst, 21 January, 27 March, 16 May, 11 Septen\ber
1924, Hearst Papers, University of Northern Iowa Library.
10. Secretary, Iowa Farna Bureau Federation to Hearst, 29 January 1925;
Ferguson to Hearst, 15 March 1925,19 January 1926; Thomas E. Johnson to
Hearst, 13 December 1926, reply, 20 December 1926, Hearst Papers; Donald
R. Murphy to Wallace, 27 June 1924; C. V. Gregory to Wallace, 25 May 1925,
Wallace Papers, University of Iowa Libraries.
11. Wallaces' Farmer, 16 September, 30 December 1921, 6 January, 21
July, 22 December 1922,12 January, 16 February 1923.
12. Theodore Saloutos and John D. Hicks, Agricultural Discontent in the
Middle West, 1900-1939 (Madison, 1951), 212, 229-31, 282; Lord, Wallaces,
182; Winters, Wallace, 111; W. R. Bayless to editor, 21 January 1925, Wallace
Papers.
13. Crawford and Rogers, Agricultural Journalism, 171; Howard, Howard,
82,84-85; James F. Evans, Prairie Farmer and WLS: The Burridge D. Butler Years
(Urbana, 111., 1969), 87; Henry A. Wallace, Oral History, Columbia University,
159-60; Lord, Wallaces, 114-16, 129-31; Donald R. Murphy to Henry A.
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approved of the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation, the paper quickly
became a leading critic of that organization and of the American
Farm Bureau Federation as well. Dante M. Pierce, the Home-
stead's publisher, preferred the organization's major rivals, the
Non-Partisan League and the Farmers Union. H. A. defended
the Farm Bureau against the Homestead's attacks, calling them
"irresponsible journalism," and warning against "any farm
paper" that was "seeking to inflict a mortal wound on the most
helpful farm organization that has yet arisen."'*
THE ECONOMIC PRESSURES of the early 1920s on Farm Bureau-type
farmers deeply ti"oubled Wallace. Farm prices had fallen sharply in
the summer before he became editor and remained low when he
took over's He sought to give his readers a clear understanding
of the situation. In keeping with one of his intellectual habits, he
quantified the crisis. He offered his readers not only statistics on
the drop in farm prices but also numbers on the relationships be-
tween those prices and other realities, such as the cost of farm
production and the cost of living, corporate income, the wages
of city workers, and prices and wages before the war. He noted,
for example, that in 1920 wages were 189 percent of prewar
earnings, while farm prices were only 110 percent. By the spring
of 1922, he observed, the farm price level was only 40 percent
above the level of 1910, while mortgages were up well over 100
percent. And early in 1923 he reported that the farmer's dollar
bought only 65 percent as much as it had in 1914. This compara-
tive approach was basic to Wallace's perception of the crisis. The
comparisons meant that the crisis was more than low prices for
farm products.'^
Wallace also offered historical perspective, comparing the
farmers' plight with farm situations in the late nineteenth cen-
tury and in the prewar years, and he also assessed future pros-
Wallace, 27]une 1924, Wallace Papers; K. R. Marvin, "Agricultural Journalism
in Iowa," in A Century of Farming in Iowa, 1846-1946 (Ames, 1946), 268.
14. Howard, Howard, 82, 84,140,190, 206; Wallaces'Farmer, 16 Septem-
ber, 4 November 1921; Saloutos and Hicks, Agricultural Discontent, 190, 212
282.
15. On the crisis, see Shideler, Farm Crisis; on Wallace's sensitivity to it
see Wallace, Oral History, 120-22.
16. Wallaces' Farmer, 22, 29 April, 27 May, 21 October, 11 November
1921, 4 April, 1, 15 September 1922, 12 January 1923.
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pects for farmers. By late 1921, he claimed, the farm situation
was worse than at any time since 1896; and farmers would find it
much more difficult, he predicted, to enjoy economic success
from 1921 to 1941 than they had from 1896 to 1916. The next
year and the year after, he projected depressed conditions for
farmers into the 1930s, possibly the 1940s.>7
As an agrarian, Wallace believed that the farm crisis harmed
the entire nation. Here, he emphasized two themes, one eco-
nomic, the other political. From the economic perspective he
stressed the iniportance of farm purchasing power, suggesting,
for example, that city workers could not expect that the prosper-
ity they enjoyed in 1923 would continue, for lasting prosperity
depended on the ability of farm people to buy the goods that city
workers produced. Pursuing the political theme, he portrayed
farmers as an essential "conservative force," but prophesied that
if the farm crisis persisted, agrarian radicalism would grow.'^ In
both cases farmers were fundamental in their importance for the
United States.
Wallace obviously believed that he faced a major event,
one with large implications for the Corn Belt and the entire
nation. Thus, the farm crisis had to be explained. Wallace's ex-
planation included emphases on the power of certain urban
groups and the enormous productivity of Corn Belt farmers.
He refused to join the "radicals" who heaped all of the blame
on "Big Business," yet he did see large eastern bankers, the
Federal Reserve system, and some giant corporations as con-
tributors to the problem.'^
Whñe radicals called for a farmer-labor alliance, Wallace ex-
pressed at least as much concern about the power of organized
labor as he did about the power of organized business. He insisted
that high wages helped to produce and prolong the farm crisis. In
his view, labor was strong and high wages were a result of that
strength. The wages paid to workers on the railroads and in the
17. Ibid., 22 July, 16 September, 18 November 1921, 12 May, 27 October
1922, 20 July, 31 August 1923; Wallace to E. T. Meredith, 26 December 1923,
Wallace Papers.
18. Wallaces' Farmer, 25 November, 2 December 1921,6 January, 1,15 Sep-
tember 1922, 24 August 1923.
19. Ibid., 10 June, 5 August, 9 September, 21 October, 11 November 1921,
5 January 1923.
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processing plants took much of the money that consumers spent
on food, leaving little for the farmer; and the money paid to many
workers forced farmers to spend too much for the goods they
needed to buy. He was especially critical of the wages paid to rail-
road workers, the demands for more made by their unions, and
their use of the strike weapon to enforce their demands. He re-
garded labor costs as the chief explanation for high freight rates.^°
In Wallace's view, Iowa farmers contributed to their own
difficulties by producing too much corn. Overproduction, he be-
lieved, was "the main reason' prices were "so unreasonably
low.'^i Having expanded production to meet wartime demands,
corn farmers now grew much more than they had before the
war. While union workers demanded shorter hours and de-
prived their employers of their labor when their demands were
not met, and while manufacturers reduced their output to main-
tain prices, farmers continued to produce at high levels, working
hard and often using the latest technologies. The weather coop-
erated, resulting in good corn yields from 1919 to 1922.^ 2
European weaknesses were the other side of the coin. Euro-
peans continued to buy American farm products, he argued, but
did so only because prices were low. Europe, Wallace argued,
was "down and out" or "bankrupt" and likely to remain so for a
generation or more. Thus, Europeans could not pay "cost of pro-
duction" for American farm products.23 The main cause of low
farm prices, he argued late in 1922, was "the fact that we have a
larger surplus of farm products for Europe to buy than before
the war, whereas Europe has an immensely weaker purchasing
power than was the case before the war." From 1900 to 1914 "the
farming people of the middle west enjoyed the greatest prosper-
ity that any large class of farming people ever enjoyed any-
where," he maintained. They did so because cities and effective
demand in them expanded in both the United States and Eu-
rope. Now, however, according to his analysis, demand re-
20. Ibid., 24 June, 26 August, 9 September, 28 October 1921,20 January,
28 July, 18, 25 August, 1 September 1922, 24, 28 September 1923.
21. Ibid., 5 January 1923.
22. Ibid., 25 March, 18 November, 23 December 1921,18 August, 17 No-
vember 1922, 5 January, 6 July 1923.
23. Ibid., 11 November 1921,3,10,17February,3November 1922,9,16
February, 6 July, 7 September 1923.
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mained effective in the United States but not in Europe, and, un-
less wise policies were initiated, real prosperity would not return
to the farm until the American urban population became large
enough to buy what Europe had bought.^"
What could be done? Farmers could be patient and wait for
migration to the city to solve the problem. Wallace noted that
many farmers and farm laborers were moving to cities as a result
of the crisis, and he did favor migration by "marginal farmers"—
those who did not prefer farm to city life and seemed incapable
of succeeding on the farm in the current situation. He may have
hoped that the migration of marginal farmers would weaken the
forces of agrarian radicalism by removing them from its ranks.
The migration remedy, however, seemed slow and painful,
made doubly so by a tendency of poor farmers to hold on to their
land with "grim determination."" On the other hand, revolu-
tionary change to a new social order, socialistic in nature, that
some advocated seemed unnecessary and unrealistic.^^ Instead,
he offered a capitalistic solution for the crisis in the operations of
the capitalistic system.
WALLACE REJECTED THE ARGUMENT that the way to solve the farm
crisis was to raise wages paid to urban labor so that workers
could buy more farm products. He argued that individuals could
spend only so much on food and would use increased income for
other purposes. A high level of urban employment was impor-
tant to farmers, but higher wages could force employers to cut
the work force.^'
When his quest for a solution to the farm problem drew his
attention to urban America, Wallace called for cuts in several
areas and expansion in others. He advocated cuts in the wages of
some workers, especially railroad workers, in freight rates, and
in interest rates, and expansion of the money supply and of in-
dustrial production and employment. These were all pleas for
voluntary action by various economic groups, not demands that
24. Ibid., 24 November, 1 December 1922.
25. Ibid., 18, 25 November 1921, 20 January 1922, 9 February, 13 April,
18 May, 23 July, 31 August, 7 September 1923.
26. Ibid., 9 February, 2 March, 17 August 1923.
27. Ibid., 19 May, 23 June 1922,1 June 1923.
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Congress force unions, financiers, and industrialists to behave
in these *^y
As for the European market, Wallace did not press for ef-
forts to strengthen it. Early in 1922 he did express concern to his
father as well as to his readers regarding the high protective tar-
iff, suggesting that Europeans needed to be able to sell manufac-
tured goods in the American market if they were to pay adequate
prices for American food, but this embarrassed his father and
generated some tension between father and son, for it chal-
lenged the Harding administration's tariff policy, so H. A.
backed off.^ ^
Instead, Wallace called for sharp cuts in corn production.
Although not the only advocate of such a program, he was
surely the most prominent one in the Middle West. Wallaces'
Farmer had begun to offer such advice in 1919, and H. A. cam-
paigned for it in 1921 and 1922.3» «Less corn, less work, more
money" was the campaign's slogan in 1921. For 1922 it was
"More clover, less corn and more money," advice that did not
challenge the farmer's belief in hard work and indicated that the
scheme would improve the soil as well as the profit-and-loss
ledger." Calling for reductions as high as 25 percent, he sug-
gested that the goal should be farm prices that were 50 percent
higher in 1923 than in 1922 and eventually at least 60 percent
above the prewar level and "up to a parity with the products of
city labor." He promised to continue to recommend cutbacks
until corn prices were within five cents of the cost of production,
but not beyond that point. "The immediate objective of farmers,"
he proposed, "should be to recover the purchasing power which
they had back in 1913 and 1914."^^
28. Ibid., 15,22 April, 24, 30 June, 19, 26 August, 9 September, 20 Octo-
ber, 11, 18 November, 23, 30 December 1921, 27 January, 30 June, 28 July
1922, 5 January, 2 March, 18 May 1923.
29. Winters, Wallace, 98-99,150,297; Schapsmeiers, Wallace, 60-61,67;
Wallaces' Farmer, 24 November 1922, 24 September 1923.
30. Schapsmeiers, Wallace, 63, 68, 86-87, 91-92; Gilbert C. Fite, George N.
Peek and the Fight for Farm Parity (Norman, Okla., 1954), 131-32; Shideler, Farm
Crisis, 86; Wallaces' Farmer, 18, 25 March, 8 AprU, 13 May, 21 October 1921, 12
January 1923.
31. Wallaces'Farmer, 8 April, 16, 23 September, 25 November 1921.
32.. Ibid., 11, 24 November 1921, 7 April, 1 September, 24 November
1 December 1922, 30 March 1923.
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Wallace was calling for economic withdrawal from Europe.
He wanted farmers to serve their "principal market," the "home
market."" Thus, farmers should cut their production of export
crops, receive protection from the tariff in the domestic market,
and expand production only as the urban population grew.^ "
Wallace was not recommending that farmers push aside
modern methods of farming. In fact, he participated at the same
time in programs designed to increase yields, including experi-
ments with hybrid corn.^ ^ He appeared to see no conflict be-
tween those efforts and the simultaneous ones to cut corn pro-
duction. Rather than recommend a return to old, less productive
methods, he advocated changes in the cropping decisions that
farmers made. He advised farmers to shift some of their acres
out of corn and into clover, oats, pasture, alfalfa, and a new crop
for Iowa, soybeans.3* He must have assumed that when the ex-
periments with hybridization produced results on the farms,
krmers would make additional cuts in the acres they devoted to
corn.
The campaign held up particular patterns of urban behav-
ior as worthy of imitation. Industrial giants cut production when
faced with deflationary pressures; labor unions pressed for
shorter hours and conducted strikes. Now farmers should be-
have in similar ways. He saw corporate behavior as an especially
attractive model; yet he also made use of the union analogy.
Farmers have just as much right to organize to control their output
as union labor has to organize for the purpose of shortening hours
and increasing wages. They have as much right to cease produc-
tion wholly or in part as union labor has to strike. It is no more
wrong for farmers to reduce production when prices are below
cost of production than it is for the United States Steel Corpora-
33. Ibid., 17 February, 17, 31 March 1922. J. Samuel Walker, Henry A.
Wallace and American Foreign Policy (Westport, Conn., 1976), 11-14, calls at-
tention to Wallace's isolationist interlude.
34. Wallaces' Farmer, 8, 29 September, 3 November 1922, 9 February,
1 June, 27 July, 31 August 1923.
35. For a survey of his role, see William L. Brown, "H.A. Wallace and the
Development of Hybrid Corn," Annals of Iowa 47 (Fall 1983), 167-79, with
comments by Alan I Marcus, 180-89, and Peter A. Peterson, 190-94.
36. Wallaces' Farmer, 12 August 1921, 6 January, 17 March 1922;
Wallace to Thomas N. Hadden, 19 February 1925, Wallace to George S.
Carter, 29 April 1925, Wallace Papers.
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tion to cut pig iron production in half when prices are rapidly
famng.37
It would be better, he assumed, if industrialists and unions
would imitate farmers by increasing production and lowering
costs and prices, but, as that seemed unlikely, farmers must cut
back.38 America would be a better place, he implied, if agrarian
values reigned, but since power arrangements dictated that they
could not, farmers must accept and conform to urban norms.
Again, Wallace did not call for government action. Instead,
he tried to persuade farmers to reduce their acreage voluntarily.
That method would later seem to be naive, even to him as well as
others, but that was after he had tried it. Now, he called for cam-
paigns "organized after the fashion of Liberty bond drives."
Quotas would be worked out for each Corn Belt state and
county; each farmer would voluntarily sign a statement agreeing
to a specified cut, and the pressure of public opinion would en-
courage farmers to live up to their promises.^^
Better economic information and organization were also es-
sential in Wallace's solution to the farm crisis. In providing the
first, public institutions must help. Corporations had the re-
sources required to serve their needs for information, but indi-
vidual farmers did not. Thus, he applauded the establishment of
the Bureau of Agricultural Economics in 1922, praised Iowa
State College for its work in agricultural economics, and criti-
cized other state colleges for ignoring the marketing side of the
fanner's life.'*°
Better organization must supplement better information.
H. A. recognized that farmers were not as well organized for the
task as United States Steel was, but, rather than advocate the
breaking up of giant corporations, he encouraged farmers to or-
ganize and "beat capital and labor at their own game." He be-
lieved that all farm organizations must support the campaign for
37. Wallaces' Farmer, 12 January 1923. See also ibid., 10 June, 29 July,
9 September 1921, 6 January 1922.
38. Ibid., 21 October 1921,6 January, 30 June 1922,5 January, 2 February
1923.
39. Ibid., 8 April, 22 July, 25 November, 2 December 1921.
40. Ibid., 8,15, 22 April, 2 December 1921, 3 March, 14 July, 25 August
1922, 6 April 1923.
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higher farm prices and that the Farm Bureau was "best fitted" to
supply leadership, for it represented "more truly the sentiment
of the rank and file of the actual dirt farmers." During 1921 and
1922 he appealed to farm organizations for action, not to gov-
ernments.""^
In 1933 Wallace would return to this emphasis on scaling
down agricultural production, but then he would rely on powers
of the national government—its taxing and spending
powers—to accomplish this purpose. Before he could endorse
such means, however, he would need to develop a more positive
attitude toward large-scale government participation in the agri-
cultural system. The inadequate results of the voluntary method
would contribute to that change.
THE CONSEQUENCES of the voluntary crop reduction campaign
of the early 1920s disappointed Wallace. He had, after all,
called for a sharp break with Iowa's agricultural past, which
featured the expansion of agricultural production. Not sur-
prisingly, he encountered considerable opposition, especially
in 1921, much of it from farm organizations, farm journals,
and farmers as well as business people. Some of it came from
the grain trade, which wished to handle a large volume of
corn and warned of shortages. Clifford Gregory, the editor of
the Chicago-based Prairie Farmer, and some of the farm orga-
nizations, above all the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation, en-
dorsed Wallace's efforts in 1922, but the farm leaders did not
work hard enough to satisfy him. They feared pubUc embar-
rassment, he reported, if the weather turned bad and food be-
came scarce, a foolish fear in his view, for statistics indicated
that low prices were a much more likely possibility. With farm
organizations and journals failing to function as he thought
the situation demanded, most farmers ignored his advice."^
Wallace's chief rival, the Iowa Homestead, proved to be an es-
pecially troublesome foe. He lashed out at "a certain farm paper"
for its opposition. "Even the Iowa Homestead, supposedly a farm
41. Ibid., 8 April, 9, 29 September, 25 November, 16 December 1921,
3 February, 22 September 1922.
42. Ibid., 1 July, 2, 9, 16 December 1921, 20, 27 January, 24 March,
7 April, 28 July, 4 August, 27 October 1922, 12 January 1923; Evans, Prairie
Farmer, 140-41; Shideler, Farm Crisis, 86-88.
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paper, is apparently shocked at the idea of reducing corn acreage."
He argued that instead of criticizing the proposal, such critics
should attack U.S. Steel. The Homestead's opposition, in his view,
was "largely due to the fact that Wallaces' Farmer was in favor of
it." Its opposition seemed very damaging, for the magazine circu-
lated in Iowa, the state that most needed the program. He urged
his competitor to "consider the proposition from the welfare of
Iowa" and remember that this was "no longer only a Wallaces'
Farmer program." While most farm papers were neutral on the
issue, the Homestead, he complained, was "as distinctly hostile to
the plan as the Price Current Grain Reporter and the Wall Street
Journal."*^
The results of the battle over corn production were not to-
tally disappointing. The low prices that followed the large har-
vest of 1921 generated more interest in 1922; corn production
was down that year, especially in Iowa, Illinois, and Missouri.
Corn prices rose the following year, although remaining well
below the level he sought.** He gave his paper some of the
credit.*5 But even though the buying power of corn remained
well below his goal, he did not repeat the experiment in 1923.
He continued to regard reduced corn acreage as more intelli-
gent and humane than the migration method and a necessary
response to the power and behavior of organized urban
groups, but he now encouraged those who had participated in
the campaign and had enriched their soil by doing so to in-
crease their corn acreage in 1923 and take advantage of the
higher prices.**
Wallace concluded that greater success depended on a
change in the rural social structure as well as bolder action by
farm organizations. The people who participated were what he
called, for this purpose, "independent farmers." They owned
their own land and were not heavily mortgaged and thus were
not controlled by landlords and creditors. They were freer to ad-
43. Wallaces' Farmer, 13 May, 28 October, 9 December 1921, 4 August
1922. ^
44. Shideler, Farm Crisis, 189-91, 280-81; Wallaces' Farmer, 9 September
1921, 17 November, 1 December 1922, 12 January, 2 February 1923.
45. Wallaces' Farmer, 1 December 1922, 9 March 1923.
46. Ibid., 27 October, 17 November, 1, 15 December 1922, 5 January
9 March 1923.
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just production than other farmers were, and they were more
easily organized. Also, they saw that reduction "would mean
that they would have to hire less outside labor." But they were
only a minority of Iowa's farmers; if they became more numer-
ous, then a production control program would have a better
chance.*^ Farm organizations and leaders also needed to change.
If they made real efforts, they could persuade "great numbers of
farmers" to cooperate. For now, however, it seemed that Corn
Belt farmers as a whole did not "care to take any organized ac-
tion" concerning the situation, and the farm movement was not
ready to do what he believed must be done.''*
The farm situation had improved but not nearly enough,
according to Wallace's analysis. Farm prices in general were
higher than they had been in 1922 and prices of urban products
were lower, but the prewar relationship had not been reestab-
lished. "What," the editor asked, "can we do now in order to put
our corn and hog business in as prosperous a condition as it was
from 1900 to
WALLACE CONTINUED to recommend production planning.^" By
late 1923, however, he had become an advocate of what he re-
garded as a complementary plan. It had originated with George
N. Peek, an Illinois farm implements manufacturer, and was em-
bodied by 1924 in the McNary-Haugen bills. Wallace had been
introduced to the plan at the National Agricultural Conference
early in 1922. Within a year he began to express interest, and
after his father came out for the plan, H. A. also did so, labeling it
"the only plan now in sight that means immediate relief for the
wheat and hog farmer." He added, "Whether it will win out in
congress this winter depends very largely on how urgently
farmers insist upon its adoption." T"o help the cause along, he
gave it strong editorial endorsement at the end of 1923 and early
in 1924.51
47. Ibid., 12 January, 19 October 1923.
48. Ibid., 13 April 1923.
49. Ibid., 1 June 1923. See also ibid., 11 May, 1 June, 26 October, 16, 30
November 1923.
50. Ibid., 28 September, 5 October 1923,11 January 1924.
51. Fite, Peek, 46; Winters, Wallace, 153-55,253-57; Wallaces'Farmer, 12
January, 15 June, 2,23,30 November 1923,4,11 January, 8,29 February 1924.
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Secretary Wallace's decision appears to have exerted alarge
influence on the editor's swing to support for the plan. H. C. had
moved slowly to endorsement, reluctant to have the federal gov-
ernment play such a large role in the agricultural system. A mod-
erately progressive Republican, he distrusted radicals as well as
conservatives, opposed reliance on either "trust busting" or gov-
ernment ownership, and preferred government regulation of
the economy, especially such segments as railroads, meat pack-
ing, stockyards, and the grain trade. He believed farmers would
benefit from such government regulation and also from im-
proved credit facilities, a high protective tariff for farm products,
exemption of cooperatives from antitrust laws, and government
stimulation of exports. He emphasized measures such as these
during his early years as secretary of agriculture and also sup-
plied farmers with a new agency, the Bureau of Agricultural Eco-
nomics, to give them essential economic information, analyses,
and forecasts. The agency would, he hoped, enable farmers to
function on equal terms with other groups in the economy and
persuade them to adjust their production to get better prices.^^
These programs failed to bring the improvements in the
farm economy that Wallace had anticipated, and although he
had refused to endorse the Peek plan when he first heard about
it early in 1922, he now concluded that conditions forced him to
accept the plan. So he announced his endorsement on Septem-
ber 25, 1923. His biographer sees this as a very significant
change in Wallace: a shift to the "left," "a compromise of his basic
philosophy regarding the relation of government to the econ-
omy." The biographer adds, "Conditions forced him . . . to pur-
sue a goal that would have sacrificed a degree of freedom for
farmers in return for the survival and security of American agri-
culture.""
After H. A. endorsed the plan, he presented it as compatible
with his own. It did make significant use of his work on price ra-
tios.^* Furthermore, it seemed to offer a way of encouraging
fanners to cut production of certain crops. Seeing harmony be-
tween the two plans, he argued, "Regulation of production will
put the farmer on his feet again in a few years, if farmers accept
52. Winters, Wallace, especially chaps. 5, 6, and 9.
53. Ibid., 253-54, 256-60, 283-85.
54. Wallace, Oral History, 129-30.
236
Wallace's Turn Toward the New Deal
the principle wholeheartedly. Regulation of production, cou-
pled with a government export corporation [as proposed in
Peek's plan], will put him on his feet in the next six months."^^
Here also was another proposal to bring the behavior of
farmers into harmony with that of urban business people.
McNary-Haugen, Wallace explained, "would permit the farmer
to sell on a protected market, just as the manufacturer sells on a
protected market."^^ What he meant was that the plan would
guarantee that the tariff protected the American farmer in the
American market just as it protected the manufacturer. In other
words, the scheme rejected proposals to take tariff protection
away from manufacturers.
DESPITE THE LINKS between H. A.'s ideas and the Peek or
McNary-Haugen plan, his endorsement of the plan represented
a significant departure for him. For one thing, it would not sever
the connection between Europe and the American farm. "Eu-
rope really needs our surplus wheat and pork, even tho [sic] she
cannot afford to pay much for this food," he now observed.^''
Even more significantly, the plan involved action by the federal
government—large-scale action. Peek advocated the establish-
ment of a government corporation, financed by a fee imposed
on participating farmers, that would buy specified commodities
at prices based on prewar standards (well above current prices)
and "dump" them in Europe at prices Europeans could afford.
The assumption was that this would prevent the surplus from
depressing the home market. As Wallace summed up, "The only
effective way we can use the European market for American
farm products during the next ten years is by means of an agri-
cultural export corporation of the type which can sell our sur-
plus at one price abroad while at the same time a much higher
price is being charged the American consumers at home."^^
Furthermore, Wallace now began to talk about checking the
migration of farmers to the city, an old agrarian theme.^^ He
55. Wallaces' Farmer, 11 January 1924. See also ibid., 2, 23 November
1923.
56. Ibid., 23 November 1923.
57. Ibid., 2, 30 November 1923.
58. Ibid., 4 January 1924. See also ibid., 2, 30 November 1923.
59. Writing several years ago, I noted the importance of this theme in
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warned that if "natural economic laws" were "allowed to take
their course . . . several hundred thousand of the less efficient
wheat and hog farmers" would be "eliminated during the next
five years" with a "vast amount of discontent and hard feeling."
Later, the United States would discover that its population had
increased to a point where it would be necessary "to put the less
efficient hog and wheat farmers .. . back to work to produce
enough to feed our people." The process struck him as "a great
waste." By holding people on the land, the new plan would avoid
that waste.^° He did not foresee that developments in agricul-
tural science and technology, including the perfection and ac-
ceptance of hybrid corn, would soon make it possible for a very
small population to serve the nation's need for food.
Wallace's thinking, influenced by intellectual change in his
father as well as by economic realities, had taken a turn. Still re-
jecting what he regarded as radical solutions that attacked big
business organizations and government programs that bene-
fited them, H. A. now concluded that farmers—very important
people in his view—must have more help from the federal gov-
ernment. He had not discarded his belief in production adjust-
ments, itself a departure from past practices, but he was disap-
pointed with the results of his campaign for cuts in corn
production and believed more must be done to raise farm prices.
They had, to be sure, already gone up some from the low level of
1921. At least the price of Iowa's main crop, corn, had. But his
statistics suggested that this was not enough and that tough
times still lay ahead unless the government, as well as farm orga-
nizations and farmers themselves, acted effectively. As he
viewed farming, it was a business operating in an economic sys-
tem in which key urban groups were already well organized,
and he believed that the farm business must also organize, but
his experience as an advocate of organized behavior persuaded
him that the process was not going forward fast enough, so a
government export corporation must also be formed. His advo-
Wallace's thinking as editor, but I did not really recognize then that it did not
become important to him until after he became a champion of the Peek/
McNary-Haugen plan. See "Mind of a Farm Leader," 150-51; "Corn Huskers
and Master Farmers: Henry A. Wallace and the Merchandising of Iowa Agri-
culture," Palimpsest 65 (May/June 1984), 85, 87, 88, 90.
60. Wallaces'Farmer, 30 November 1923.
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cacy of government action to raise farm prices anticipated ways
in which the New Deal would reshape the agricultural
em.
Wallace's thought in the eariy 1920s anticipated the New
Deal for agriculture in yet another way, one that emerges clearly
when comparisons are made with James Baird Weaver and
Smith Wildman Brookhart. They, especially Brookhart, repre-
sented the radicalism that Wallace feared. The farm editor,
although by no means happy with the leadership of Herbert
Hoover and other men at the top in the 1920s, did fit into the
New Era more comfortably than the senator did. Unlike
Brookhart, Wallace did not believe that the power of the corpo-
rations was the problem, however much he might have preferred
a more decentralized economic system. He believed that if farm-
ers organized and had certain types of help from government,
they could survive and prosper in a system that included large
business and labor organizations. Farmers could, in other words,
become part of the new order; they need not rebel against it.
Thus, Wallace brought to the New Deal not only a quite positive
attitude toward the role of the federal government in agriculture
but also a hostility toward radicalism that was also an important
component of the New Deal. That political movement and gov-
ernmental program was an antirevolutionary response to a situ-
ation with revolutionary potential as well as a significant stage
in a long-term, large-scale transformation of American capital-
ism and a major contributor to the development of an economic
system dominated by the interplay among large public and pri-
vate organizations.^^
61. See Richard S. Kirkendall, "The New Deal and Agriculture," in John
Braeman et al.. The New Deal, 2 vols. (Columbus, 1975), 1: 83-109.
62. See Richard S. Kirkendall, The UnitedStates, 1929-1945: Years of Crisis
and Change (New York, 1974), especially chap. 13; and idem, "The New Deal
and American Politics," in Harvard Sitkoff, ed.. Fifty Years Later: The New Deal
Evaluated (New York, 1985), 11-36.
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